INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9 earthquake (on the Richter scale) struck the east coast of Japan. The earthquake, together with the resulting series of large tsunami waves affected several nuclear power facilities, either directly by damaging onsite equipment, or indirectly by impairing the supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical power grid. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station faced a particularly challenging situation including a loss of all AC electrical power for four of their six units and a loss of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) makeup. Consequently, severe damage to the fuel and a series of hydrogen explosions occurred.
Considering the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station in Japan, several initiatives were launched worldwide to assess the lessons learned. These include the ENSREG stress tests [1] , the ONR Final Report [2] , the IAEA Expert Mission Report [3] , and the U.S. NRC's Near-Term Task Force [4] . The purpose of this report is to describe the different lessons learned evaluations of the Fukushima event throughout the nuclear industry and how the AP1000 plant was evaluated in light of the lessons learned. Furthermore, a description of how the AP1000 design, consisting of passive safety systems, is inherently capable of responding to a Fukushima-like event is provided.
LESSONS LEARNED EVALUATIONS OF THE FUKUSHIMA EVENT
Throughout the industry, various evaluations were performed to ensure the events which occurred at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station never happen again. Each of these efforts is described below.
ENREG Stress Tests
The nuclear accident in the Japanese Fukushima nuclear power station prompted European decision-makers to make actions to ensure such an accident never happens in Europe. Energy Ministers, regulators, experts and nuclear industry representatives in Europe agreed on the introduction of targeted safety and risk assessments (so-called "stress tests") for nuclear power plants in the Member States. Common safety terms and standards were developed and related assessments carried out for the purpose of safety in the light of the events in Fukushima.
Safety Terms of Reference (STORE) were prepared alongside the "stress test" specification issued by the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA). The scope of the targeted safety and risk assessment, as defined in [1] , was split into three parts including initiating events (IE), consequential loss of safety functions due to the IE, and accident management issues for core melt and degraded spent fuel pool (SFP) scenarios.
ONR Final Report
The ONR Final Report [2] identifies various matters that were reviewed to determine whether there are any reasonably practicable improvements to the safety of the UK nuclear industry given the event at Fukushima. Resulting recommendations were grouped into logical categories and the responsible party to address them (government, regulator, industry). In their report, the ONR provided recommendations that should be examined following the events of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. Not all recommendations were applicable to Westinghouse or the AP1000 design, including site emergency plans, as that is the licensee's responsibility. However, proper input is provided to the licensee.
IAEA Mission Report
The IAEA International Mission on Remediation of Large Contaminated Areas Off-site the Fukushima Daiichi NPS had three objectives including providing assistance to Japan assessing the progress with the remediation of the area, reviewing the strategies, plans and works, and sharing its finding with the international community as a lessons learned. The output of their initiative is summarized in [3] .
US NRC Report
The U.S. NRC Near-Term Task Force assessment [4] set forth recommendations similar to the recommendations presented in the ONR Final Report and the IAEA Mission Report. The NRC task force also concluded that by nature of the passive designs and inherent 72-hour coping capability for core, containment, and spent fuel cooling with no operator action required the AP1000 design has many of the design features and attributes necessary to address the NRC task force recommendations including SFP instrumentation.
WESTINGHOUSE REVIEW OF FUKUSHIMA LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE AP1000 PLANT
Reviewing lessons learned is a hallmark of the nuclear industry and inherent to the Westinghouse safety culture. In response to the Fukushima accident, Westinghouse immediately established an internal team to perform a comprehensive review of the AP1000 design. In parallel with these efforts, Westinghouse developed publically available technical white papers listed in [5] [6] [7] to inform stakeholders of the capability of the AP1000 plant to cope with similar events. As part of the response to the Fukushima accident, Westinghouse evaluated the lessons learned coming from the various international reviews summarized in the previous sections.
Stress tests for the AP1000 design were performed by Westinghouse within the framework of the European Passive Plant (EPP) program in cooperation with Ansaldo and the member utilities (RWE, EON, EDF, GDF-SUEZ, and Vattenfall); they are documented within [1] . In response to the ONR Final Report [2] , Westinghouse reviewed the findings and lessons learned from and performed a thorough evaluation in conjunction with the AP1000 plant EU stress tests. As part of a response to the report, Westinghouse reviewed the IAEA Expert Mission Report [3] , which identified the findings and lessons learned from the Fukushima accident and responded directly to the recommendations. Lastly, the Near Term Task Force (NRC) recommendations discussed within [4] relevant to the AP1000 design certification are limited to: seismic and flooding protection; mitigation of prolonged station blackout; and enhanced instrumentation and makeup capability for spent fuel pools (the AP1000 plant SFP instrumentation design was accepted by the NRC as discussed above). Westinghouse provided a review and discussions for each of the evaluations, with overall findings discussed further within Section 4 below.
RESULTS OF FUKUSHIMA EVALUATION OF THE AP1000 PLANT
The conclusions of these assessments are best reviewed by understanding the conservatisms in the AP1000 design and how it reacts to external hazards and copes with a station blackout, discussed below.
Seismic Margin
The AP1000 plant is designed for an earthquake defined by a peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0.30g, which envelopes the European Utility Requirements Document (EUR) requirement of a horizontal PGA of 0.25g. Additionally, a seismic margin assessment (SMA) was performed for the AP1000 plant to demonstrate margin over the PGA of 0.3g. The goal of the SMA was to demonstrate that the plant high confidence, low probability of failure (HCLPF) is at least 0.5g PGA. The results of the seismic margin assessment actually show an even greater margin for most of the safety functions, including the maintaining of the three fission product barriers [cladding, reactor coolant system (RCS) and containment]. Damage to the reactor fuel and internals have a HCLPF in the 0.50-0.60g range while RCS piping HCLPF is >0.8g. The containment vessel HCLPF is ≥ 0.73g, which is the final barrier to fission product release. Note that all other Seismic Category I structures, such as the auxiliary building housing the spent fuel pool (SFP), have an HCLPF ≥ 0.67g. Based on the above information, even for beyond design basis (BDB) seismic events, at least up to the 0.5g, the AP1000 design provides a high confidence in a low probability of failure for critical safety structures, systems, and components.
Flooding Margin
Nuclear power plants are designed to effectively manage flooding levels up to the design basis flood with some degree of margin beyond the design level for floods. An appropriate definition of site specific limits for the maximum expected flooding levels is important to protect the plant. AP1000 plant is very resilient in its capability to mitigate impacts from BDB flooding. In the unlikely scenario that an AP1000 plant suffers a severe flood which exceeds the design basis, the reactor core and Spent Fuel Pool remain protected. The robustness evaluation performed for AP1000 plant has shown that the AP1000 design provides margin beyond the flooding design basis to maintain a safe shutdown condition with no fuel damage or radiological releases to the general public for extreme BDB flood levels. The AP1000 plant can perform these functions after the postulated loss of all on-site AC and DC power sources with minimal operator actions in the first 72 hours. Important to this conclusion are the location of passive core cooling systems inside containment and their design to "fail safe" upon loss of power, loss of I&C, and loss of instrument air. Additionally, by virtue of the conservative approach used in the evaluation, the combination of a BDB seismic event with a BDB flood event will not result in more severe consequences than those described for the individual events as described in Section 4.4.
Station Blackout Coping Strategies
For the AP1000 design, the underlying strategies for coping with extended loss of AC power events involve a three-stage approach:
First 72 Hours
For the first 72 hours following an event that challenges the passive systems, the AP1000 plant safety-related passive systems automatically establish and maintain core cooling, core reactivity control, containment cooling, and main control room (MCR) habitability without the support of any AC power or makeup to the ultimate heat sink. Limited operator actions are required to maintain safe conditions in the SFP via passive means.
72 Hours to 7 Days
Following the 72-hour passive system coping time, support is required to continue passive system cooling. This support can be provided with a limited number of operator actions by installed plant ancillary equipment or by offsite equipment interfacing with installed plant connections to extend the delivery of these key safety functions. These actions are to initiate operation of small defense-in-depth ancillary diesel generators and to align additional cooling water sources for containment and SFP cooling. The additional cooling water can be supplied using the defense-in-depth passive containment cooling recirculation pumps, from the dedicated defense-in-depth passive containment cooling ancillary water storage tank in the yard. This installed ancillary equipment and stored cooling water are capable of supporting passive system cooling from 3 days after the station blackout to 7 days after the station blackout.
Beyond 7 Days
After 7 days, assuming offsite AC power or standby onsite AC power has not been restored, additional actions are required to continue to support these functions. These actions relate to providing additional consumables in the form of makeup water for containment cooling and SFP cooling and diesel fuel for the ancillary diesel generators. There are several onsite sources of makeup water available to extend passive SFP and containment cooling. All are at ambient temperature and pressure. These include the demineralised water storage tank and the fire protection water storage tanks. Depending on the availability of non-safety-related sources onsite, it is possible that these items may be needed to be brought in from offsite.
AP1000 Design Assessment for Multiple Beyond Design Bases Scenarios
The AP1000 design has also been evaluated for the impact on the design for multiple BDB events occurring simultaneously. The scenario considered includes a BDB Seismic Event and BDB Flooding coincident with a station blackout (loss of offsite power (LOOP) and loss of onsite power).
At Full Power
This case considers the plant is at full 100% power operation about 15 days after a refueling with the SFP full and decay heat level is at a maximum for the most conservative case. In addition to the normal reactions of the plant from this event (trip of turbine/generator, reactor trip, major site building remain structurally intact, and emergency procedures are initiated) the standby diesel generators fail to start, and the defense-in-depth SFP piping is assumed to fail, causing 1.83 m (6 ft) of water to drain from the SFP.
After the BDB seismic event occurs (0.52g earthquake was magnitude of the event at Fukushima), analysis shows that some grid crushing in peripheral reactor fuel assemblies occurs with insertion of sufficient rods and borated water to safely shutdown the plant. Furthermore, analysis has shown that local failures within the RPV internals are possible, but not significant enough to prevent rod insertion. Availability of safety-related equipment is postulated due to redundancy of systems and platforms after the seismic event, since flooding has not occurred yet. Class 1E batteries actuate the passive residual heat removal (PRHR) heat exchanger to remove core decay heat through natural circulation before the flooding occurs, since the diesel generators do not start as a result of the more severe BDB seismic event. Without the diesels, the actuation of the PRHR HX will happen within minutes due to the rapid loss of steam generator water level. The core makeup tanks (CMTs) similarly actuate from the Class 1E batteries to maintain RCS inventory and provide long-term shutdown boration.
After the BDB flood occurs (assume 30 minutes, with Fukushima event having flood 56 minutes after seismic event), the safety-related batteries are assumed to flood, and external water sources discussed above are considered unavailable. Main control room functions are also assumed to be lost at this point. If the BDB flood occurs before the actuation of the PRHR and CMTs, the (air operated valves) AOVs required fail in the open position, ensuring its availability. The availability of the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) is ensured through the use of fail open valves, providing fail-safe containment cooling functionality. The safety systems for the AP1000 plant which actuate as discussed above are shown in Figure 1 . For SFP cooling, the water within the pool does not boil until at least 7 hours after accident initiation. After this time, sources of water are available to provide makeup to the SFP for 72 hours. This includes the cask washdown pit, fuel transfer canal, and the Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST).
After 72 hours, due to the potential loss of onsite water tanks and the flooding of the diesel generators and fire pump, the main source of the PCCWST/SFP makeup will be portable self-powered pumps brought in from offsite. The pumps are only effective if brought in and connected to safety-related connections after the flood water has receded to grade (which is assumed to happen after 72 hours). This will allow the SFP and containment to be indefinitely cooled so long as offsite or onsite water is available. Raw water can be used without significant economic consequences.
During an Outage
This case considered that the AP1000 plant is in a refueling outage and the entire core has been transferred to the SFP. It is assumed that the BDB seismic event and flood occur just after refueling operations as the most limiting case. All conditions in the plant are the same as the "At Full Power" condition except that the reactor and turbine trips do not occur since the reactor is shut down, fuel damage is not a concern since the assemblies are all in the SFP, and the passive core cooling functions are not required, allowing for the use of the PCS for SFP cooling.
After flooding occurs, the alignment of the cask loading pit during refueling allows for makeup to the SFP. After passively boiling the water within the SFP and makeup volume, the operator has approximately 36 hours to manually align the PCS to the SFP. It is reasonable to assume that the valve alignment to isolate the PCCWST from the containment and redirect to the SFP has already been completed due to Technical Specifications which cause this valve alignment during refueling operations after the heat load from the core is below a certain limit. At this point, makeup water can be throttled to the SFP by the operator to provide makeup water for approximately 8.7 days following the accident.
After this time, further SFP makeup would be provided by an offsite or onsite water source.
Interrupted Refueling
This case assumes that the AP1000 plant is in a refueling outage and a portion of the fuel has been transferred to the SFP, such that there is a significant heat load in both the SFP and reactor core (containment). During an outage, the Technical Specifications align the PCCWST to the containment until cooling can be performed by air, when it is then aligned to the SFP. This case considers the maximum point where the containment requires the PCCWST alignment. All conditions in the plant are the same as the "At Full Power" condition, except that reactor and turbine trips do not occur since the reactor is shut down.
Since the RCS and refueling cavity are filled with water from the In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) there is approximately 4 hours until boiling of the water occurs. Recirculation of this boiling water from the fail-safe design of the passive core cooling system (PXS) in conjunction with the PCS cools the containment.
The SFP is cooled initially through boiling off of the water within the SFP above the bottom of the already aligned cask loading pit and fuel transfer canal since refueling was being performed before the accident. This alignment will allow passive makeup sources for more than 36 hours. After this time, further SFP makeup would be provided by an offsite or onsite water source.
Lessons Learned
The AP1000 plant is a robust design with exceptional performance in response to extreme external events. This is due to 3 fundamental safety advancements; the AP1000 design is fail-safe, the AP1000 plant is self-sustained, and the AP1000 plant is self-contained.
Despite the robustness of the AP1000 design, it is normal nuclear design practice to review significant events to develop lessons learned, especially for new plant designs. Furthermore, licensing authorities expect plant designers and licensees to reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable if additional reasonably practicable design features, operational measures, or accident management procedures to lower the risk further can be implemented.
Therefore, Westinghouse has incorporated lessons learned and will continue to evaluate the plant for design enhancements that may enhance the performance of the AP1000 design in response to extreme events.
CONCLUSIONS
For a Fukushima-like event, the AP1000 design demonstrates robustness with respect to beyond design basis seismic and flooding hazards and mitigation of simultaneous BDB events. The passive safety systems ensure that the core remains cool, the containment remains intact, and SFP cooling is maintained for the first 72 hours. After 72 hours, the AP1000 design has permanently installed ancillary equipment as well as connection points for portable equipment to extend the operation of the passive safety systems indefinitely.
The AP1000 nuclear power plant passive design represents a significant improvement over conventional PWRs, and is developed around the fundamental design principles of safety, simplification and standardization. The development of the AP1000 plant safety concept based on passive systems allows full realization of the benefits of these fundamental design principles. The adoption of passive systems as the primary means to deliver safety functions, combined with reliable defense-in-depth active systems, allows achievement of both an unparalleled level of safety and optimized support for investment protection. These benefits are especially evident when evaluating the AP1000 design's ability to meet the lessons learned and recommendations coming from the ENSREG stress tests, the ONR Final Report, the IAEA Expert Mission Report, and the U.S. NRC's Near-Term Task Force.
